I don't understand why you think some work on animal wefare post-ASI looks valuable, but not (e.g.) digital minds post-ASI and s-risks post-ASI. To me, it looks like working on these causes (and others?) have similar upsides (scale, neglectedness) and downsides (low tractability if ASI changes everything) to working on animal welfare post-ASI. Could you clarify why they're different?

I would like to see somebody argue that YIMBYism / abundance shouldn't be considered an EA priority. (Hard mode, given we don't own our donors' money: YIMBYism / abundance shouldn't receive OP money).

This is not a good use of money. Maybe $100 for this, and the rest can save children or animals?

What's the global market size [or VC invested] of the black soldier fly farming industry by [year]?

What % of [Asian, African, South American] egg supply will be covered by a cage-free commitment by [year]? What % of production will be cage-free?

What % of egg supply [in the US, China, Europe, globally] will use in ovo sexing by [year]?

In kg/capita, what's meat consumption [and/or chicken, fish, shrimp consumption, data permitting] in [US, China, Europe, globally] by [year]? How many countries will have stable or declining meat consumption?

Will [major fast food chain, e.g. McDonald's] carry a vegan option in the US by [year]? (This might be tricky to operationalise)

Maybe 2030 or 2035 for the year but I don't have a strong opinion. +1 to all of James's questions too.

I vote that slowing intensification is a bit more likely to be the best use of resources at current margins. I agree that this probably has lower tractability and that, as @Moritz Stumpe 🔸 says, the African advocacy movement can't effectively absorb as much funding and labour as the Asian movement. But I think there's a very narrow window to slow the takeoff of sub-Saharan factory farming, and we should take the low-probability, high-EV, urgent bet while we can.

That said, I actually think that steering this takeoff, i.e. 'welfare advoacy in future high production regions', is probably a better use of resources than either slowing intensification or 'welfare advocacy in neglected, high production regions'.

It's a great question, Angel, and I strongly think everybody should feel highly uncertain -- I feel very open to changing my mind. I've been researching the intensification of hen farming in sub-Saharan Africa for the past few months, so that informs my answer, but I don't feel as informed about intensification in Latin America, or the intensification of aquaculture.

Latin America and the Caribbean together account for approximately 72,000 km, compared to Africa’s 40,000 km

Do you have a guess for what % of each coastline is already used for aquaculture?

Hey Kieran! I guess you're thinking about fish and invertebrate welfare as the more talent-constrained subcauses (correct me if I'm wrong?) but I'm curious which kinds of profiles or job types you think are more talent-constrained than others? Also interested in your take, @lauren_mee 🔸 !

it's just smaller than other conflicts

It's odd to say this when you don't give a comparable casualty figure for Gaza, which would be 77,000 to 109,000 for May 2025, and when you estimate that, with a famine, casualties could reach 2,100,000.

I think it's worthwhile distinguishing between the demandingness objection as an argument against insect/worm/mite/nematodes' interests mattering, and as an argument against them being sentient. I think you can make the first case but not the second.

This makes sense, thanks for the response! :)